Contracting on Violence

  title={Contracting on Violence},
  author={Milan W. Svolik},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={765 - 794}
  • Milan W. Svolik
  • Published 1 October 2013
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
Why does the military intervene in the politics of some countries but remain under firm civilian control in others? The paper argues that the origins of military intervention in politics lie in a fundamental moral hazard problem associated with authoritarian repression. Dictators must deter those who are excluded from power from challenging them. When underlying, polity-wide conflict results in threats to the regime that take the particular form of mass, organized, and potentially violent… 

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