Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching

  title={Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching},
  author={John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts which subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer–seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes; moreover, in contrast to results for the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, if any agent’s preferences are not substitutable, then the existence of a stable outcome cannot be guaranteed. We show… CONTINUE READING
Highly Cited
This paper has 29 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.


Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 40 references

Contracts vs

F. Echenique
salaries in matching. American Economic Review 102 (1), 594–601. • 2012
View 9 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Implementation of college admission rules *

Tarlk Kara, Tayfnn Siinmez
View 5 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Putting Auction Theory to Work

View 7 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems

J. Economic Theory • 2006
View 6 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis

A. E. Roth, M.A.O. Sotomayor
Cambridge University Press. • 1990
View 2 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…