Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models

@inproceedings{Cvitanic2012ContractTI,
  title={Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models},
  author={Jaksa Cvitanic and Jianfeng Zhang},
  year={2012}
}
Preface.- PART I Introduction: 1.The Principal-Agent Problem.- 2.Single-Period Examples.- PART II First Best. Risk Sharing under Full Information: 3.Linear Models with Project Selection, and Preview of Results.- 4.The General Risk Sharing Problem.- PART III Second Best. Contracting Under Hidden Action- The Case of Moral Hazard: 5.The General Moral Hazard Problem.- 6.DeMarzo and Sannikov (2007), Biais et al (2007) - An Application to Capital Structure Problems: Optimal Financing of a Company… CONTINUE READING

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