Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare

  title={Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare},
  author={Douglas W. Allen and Dean L Lueck},
  journal={The Journal of Law and Economics},
  pages={397 - 426}
  • D. Allen, D. Lueck
  • Published 1 October 1992
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Law and Economics
E CONOMISTS have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture, particularly sharecropping. While economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts, few empirical studies have been undertaken. The dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern Western agriculture.' This is an important omission, not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on… 
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