Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail

  title={Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail},
  author={J. Watson},
  journal={Law & Economics},
  • J. Watson
  • Published 2002
  • Computer Science, Economics
  • Law & Economics
  • This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in setting of complete, but unverifiable, information. The main point of the paper is that the consideration of renegotiation necessitates formal examination of other technological constraints, especially those having to do with the timing and nature of inalienable productive decisions. The main technical contributions include (a) results that characterize of the sets of implementable state-contingent payoffs… CONTINUE READING
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