Contextually Private Mechanisms

  title={Contextually Private Mechanisms},
  author={Andrea B. Haupt and Zo{\"e} Hitzig},
  journal={Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
  • A. Haupt, Zoë Hitzig
  • Published 20 December 2021
  • Computer Science
  • Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Consider a mechanism design environment in which a designer sequentially queries agents' private information to determine the outcome of a choice rule. The designer's social and technological environment constrains the set of access protocols that it can use. In high-tech environments, arbitrary cryptographic protocols are admissible, and so privacy concerns do not constrain the set of available choice rules. In other environments, privacy desiderata are needed to guide design. A protocol is… 

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