Corpus ID: 1578741

Contagion through learning

@article{Steiner2008ContagionTL,
  title={Contagion through learning},
  author={Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart},
  journal={Theoretical Economics},
  year={2008},
  volume={3},
  pages={431-458}
}
We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related incomplete information game with subjective priors. The use of extrapolations in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close to the… Expand

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