Constrained school choice

@article{Haeringer2009ConstrainedSC,
  title={Constrained school choice},
  author={Guillaume Haeringer and F. Klijn},
  journal={J. Econ. Theory},
  year={2009},
  volume={144},
  pages={1921-1947}
}
  • Guillaume Haeringer, F. Klijn
  • Published 2009
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures typically impede a student to submit a preference list that contains… CONTINUE READING
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