Corpus ID: 237571906

Constrained School Choice with Incomplete Information

  title={Constrained School Choice with Incomplete Information},
  author={Hugo Gimbert and Claire Mathieu and Simon Mauras},
School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algorithm to solve this problem is the celebrated deferred acceptance procedure, proposed by Gale and Shapley. After both sides have revealed their mutual preferences, the algorithm computes an optimal stable matching. Most often in practice, notably when the process is implemented by a national clearinghouse and… Expand

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