Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England

@article{North1989ConstitutionsAC,
  title={Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England},
  author={Douglass Cecil North and Barry R. Weingast},
  journal={The Journal of Economic History},
  year={1989},
  volume={49},
  pages={803-832}
}
  • Douglass Cecil North, Barry R. Weingast
  • Published 1989
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Economic History
  • The article studies the evolution of the constitutional arrangements in seventeenth-century England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It focuses on the relationship between institutions and the behavior of the government and interprets the institutional changes on the basis of the goals of the winners—secure property rights, protection of their wealth, and the elimination of confiscatory government. We argue that the new institutions allowed the government to commit credibly to… CONTINUE READING

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