Constitutional monarchy as power sharing

  title={Constitutional monarchy as power sharing},
  author={George Tridimas},
  journal={Constitutional Political Economy},
  • G. Tridimas
  • Published 17 June 2021
  • Economics, History, Political Science
  • Constitutional Political Economy
In the transition to democracy some autocracies transformed to republics while others evolved to constitutional monarchies. The paper inquires how constitutional monarchy is established. It models a hereditary king and a liberal challenger who coexist over a succession of periods and fight for power which brings office rents and the right to decide one’s preferred policy. The outcome of the confrontation is uncertain and may vary from period to period. If the king wins, he establishes absolute… 

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