Consider This : Firm-Sponsored Training and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete ∗

  title={Consider This : Firm-Sponsored Training and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete ∗},
  author={Evan Starr},
This paper theoretically and empirically examines the impact of noncompete enforceability on firmsponsored training. A change from non-enforcement to maximal enforceability increases firm-sponsored for training by at least 13.7% and reduces wages by 2.35% for occupations frequently found in noncompete litigation. Estimates using aggregate measures of noncompete enforceability, however, mask significant heterogeneity in the impact of consideration-specific dimensions of enforceability: Laws… CONTINUE READING


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