Consequences of fluctuating group size for the evolution of cooperation

@article{Brnnstrm2011ConsequencesOF,
  title={Consequences of fluctuating group size for the evolution of cooperation},
  author={{\AA}ke Br{\"a}nnstr{\"o}m and Thilo Gross and Bernd Blasius and Ulf Dieckmann},
  journal={Journal of mathematical biology},
  year={2011},
  volume={63 2},
  pages={263-81}
}
Studies of cooperation have traditionally focused on discrete games such as the well-known prisoner's dilemma, in which players choose between two pure strategies: cooperation and defection. Increasingly, however, cooperation is being studied in continuous games that feature a continuum of strategies determining the level of cooperative investment. For the continuous snowdrift game, it has been shown that a gradually evolving monomorphic population may undergo evolutionary branching, resulting… CONTINUE READING