Corpus ID: 15408806

Consciousness Constrained : A Commentary on Being No One

  title={Consciousness Constrained : A Commentary on Being No One},
  author={Bernard Baars and M. Tye},
ABSTRCT: In this commentary, I criticize Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach to fixing the explanandum of a theory of consciousness and I offer a commonsense alternative in its place. I then re-evaluate Metzinger's multi-faceted working concept of consciousness, and argue for a shift away from the notion of "global availability" and towards the notio ns of "perspectivalness" and "transparency." This serves to highlight the role of Metzinger's "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation… Expand
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  • F. Peters
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Psychological research
  • 2010
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