Consciousness, Supervenience, and Identity: Marras and Kim on the Efficacy of Conscious Experience

  title={Consciousness, Supervenience, and Identity: Marras and Kim on the Efficacy of Conscious Experience},
  author={Liam P. Dempsey},
  pages={373 - 395}
In this paper, I argue that while supervenience accounts of mental causation in general have difficulty avoiding epiphenomenalism, the situation is particularly bad in the case of conscious experiences since the function-realizer relation, arguably present in the case of intentional properties, does not obtain, and thus, the metaphysical link between supervenient and subvenient properties is absent. I contend, however, that the identification of experiential types with their neural correlates… Expand


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Sensations and brain processes
  • H. Flohr
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Behavioural Brain Research
  • 1995
A hypothesis on the physiological conditions of consciousness is presented and it is assumed that neural assemblies instantiate mental representations; hence consciousness depends on the rate at which large active assemblies are generated. Expand