Conscientious regulation and post-regulatory employment restrictions

@article{Brezis1997ConscientiousRA,
  title={Conscientious regulation and post-regulatory employment restrictions},
  author={Elise S. Brezis and Avi Weiss},
  journal={European Journal of Political Economy},
  year={1997},
  volume={13},
  pages={517-536}
}

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