Conflict and convention in dynamic networks

  title={Conflict and convention in dynamic networks},
  author={Michael Foley and Patrick Forber and Rory Smead and Christoph Riedl},
  journal={Journal of The Royal Society Interface},
An important way to resolve games of conflict (snowdrift, hawk–dove, chicken) involves adopting a convention: a correlated equilibrium that avoids any conflict between aggressive strategies. Dynamic networks allow individuals to resolve conflict via their network connections rather than changing their strategy. Exploring how behavioural strategies coevolve with social networks reveals new dynamics that can help explain the origins and robustness of conventions. Here, we model the emergence of… 

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    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
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