Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information : How the Future Matters

  title={Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information : How the Future Matters},
  • Published 2000
Conflict and war are typically viewed as the outcome of misperceptions, incomplete information, or even irrationality. We show that it can be otherwise. Despite the short-run incentives to settle disputes peacefully, there can be long-term, compounding rewards to going to war when doing better relative to one’s opponent today implies doing better tomorrow. Peaceful settlement involves not only sharing the pie available today but also foregoing the possibility, brought about by war, of gaining a… CONTINUE READING
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