Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses as Relations

  title={Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses as Relations},
  author={Aysel Doğan},
  journal={Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
  • Aysel Doğan
  • Published 1 September 2005
  • Philosophy, Business
  • Journal for General Philosophy of Science
SummaryIn spite of several attempts to explicate the relationship between a scientific hypothesis and evidence, the issue still cries for a satisfactory solution. Logical approaches to confirmation, such as the hypothetico-deductive method and the positive instance account of confirmation, are problematic because of their neglect of the semantic dimension of hypothesis confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of confirmation are no better than logical approaches in this regard. An outstanding… 
The Problem of Unconceived Objections Forthcoming in Argumentation
In this paper, I argue that, just as the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA) provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Science to the effect that a realist view of science is
The Problem of Unconceived Objections
In this paper, I argue that, just as the problem of unconceived alternatives provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Science to the effect that a realist view of science is


Heuristic Novelty and the Asymmetry Problem in Bayesian Confirmation Theory*
  • R. Nunan
  • Philosophy
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1993
Bayesian confirmation theory, as traditionally interpreted, treats the temporal relationship between the formulation of a hypothesis and the confirmation (or recognition) of evidence entailed by that
The foundations of scientific inference
Not since Ernest Nagel s 1939 monograph on the theory of probability has there been a comprehensive elementary survey of the philosophical problems of probablity and induction. This is an
The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping
The main appeal of the currently popular "bootstrap" account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had
The Semantic Approach to Scientific Theories
The purpose of this paper is not to be new or original, but to provide a concise exposition of a certain approach in philosophy of science, at the hands of a loosely associated group of contemporary
Science without laws
This text offers a mediating experience perspective on an increasingly volatile line of enquiry. The author does not question major findings of modern science: for example, that the universe is
Mendel and Methodology
  • R. Root-Bernstein
  • History
    History of science; an annual review of literature, research and teaching
  • 1983
There is, I believe, a fundamental tension between the statistical assumptions and the biological reality ofgenetics that accounts for the debate over Mendel's integrity and it is still possible that the monk may be redeemed.
The semantic conception of theories and scientific realism
Frederick Suppe has come to enjoy a position of undisputed leadership in the post-positivistic philosophy of science. Students of the field will therefore welcome publication of the present account
Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach
This new edition of Howson and Urbach's account of scientific method from the Bayesian standpoint includes chapter exercises and extended material on topics such as regression analysis, distributions densities, randomisation and conditionalisation.
Three theses about dispositions
questions. First, is it a necessary truth that disposi? tions have causal bases; or is it only a contingent truth for dispositions like fragility, while being perhaps a contingent falsehood for
The Dappled World
It is often supposed that the spectacular successes of our modern mathematical sciences support a lofty vision of a world completely ordered by one single elegant theory. In this book Nancy