Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions

  title={Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions},
  author={Martin Bichler and Jayant Kalagnanam},
  journal={European Journal of Operational Research},
The theory of procurement auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity and quality is fixed prior to source selection. Multi-attribute reverse auctions allow negotiation over price and qualitative attributes such as color, weight, or delivery time. They promise higher market efficiency through a more effective information exchange of buyer s preferences and supplier s offerings. This paper focuses on a number of winner determination problems in multiattribute auctions. Previous work… CONTINUE READING
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6 Excerpts

Multiattribute reverse auctions

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  • Presented at AAAI
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3 Excerpts

Resource allocation algorithms for electronic auctions: A framework design

  • M. Bichler, J. Lee, H. S. Lee, J. Kalagnanam
  • Presented at 3rd International Conference on…
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3 Excerpts

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