Confidence in judgment

  title={Confidence in judgment},
  author={Nigel Harvey},
  journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  • N. Harvey
  • Published 1 May 1997
  • Psychology
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask.
Determining why some people, some domains, and some types of judgments are more prone to overconfidence will be important to understanding how confidence judgments are made.
Perceptual underconfidence : a conceptual illusion
Experimental interest in human decision making has been fertile in the past two decades. It is generally recognized that answers to questions involving general knowledge tend to produce
Being Rational and Being Wrong
Do people tend to be overconfident in their opinions? Many think so. They’ve run studies to test whether people are calibrated : whether their confidence in their opinions matches the proportion of
Like goes with like: The role of representativeness in erroneous and pseudo-scientific beliefs.
As its name implies, the heuristics and biases approach to human judgment has both positive and negative agendas (Griffin, Gonzalez, & Varey, 2001). The positive agenda is to identify the mental
Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?
Much research in the last two decades has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision making and rational judgment (e.g.,
Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate?
In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, the implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap are examined.
Two systems of reasoning.
THE EMPIRICAL CASE FOR TWO SYSTEMS OF REASONING The stimulation from a classic paper in the heuristics and biases tradition does not come only from the insights provided into processes of judgment
Like every discipline, theorizing in linguistics crucially involves drawing (often tentative) conclusions about the relation between the available evidence and the theories under consideration. At
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a survey of 84 participants at the 1969 meetings of the Mathematical Psychology Society and the American
Heuristics and Biases: Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning
The student of judgment uses the probability calculus as a standard of comparison much as a student of perception might compare the perceived size of objects to their physical sizes to determine the “correct” probability of events.


Determinants of Overconfidence and Miscalibration: The Roles of Random Error and Ecological Structure☆
Abstract Previous authors have attributed findings of overconfidence to psychological bias or to experimental designs unrepresentative of the environment. This paper provides evidence for an
A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination
  • W. Ferrell
  • Psychology
    Perception & psychophysics
  • 1995
In a recent issue of this journal, Björkman, Juslin, and Winman (1993) presented a model of the calibration of subjective confidence judgments for sensory discrimination which they called “subjective
The False Consensus Effect and Overconfidence: Flaws in Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment?
Abstract The false consensus effect and the overconfidence in judgment effect are often referred to as established “facts” of psychology. At present, the empirical support for these effects is
Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: a single model for both.
  • W. Ferrell
  • Psychology
    Scandinavian journal of psychology
  • 1994
It is demonstrated that the model does not predict underconfidence, that it is fully compatible with the overconfidence frequently found in calibration studies with cognitive tasks, and that it well represents experimental results from such studies.
Overconfidence in Probability and Frequency Judgments: A Critical Examination
The overconfidence observed in calibration studies has recently been questioned on both psychological and methodological grounds. In the first part of the article we discuss these issues and argue
Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments : Two different accounts
The purpose of this study was to test predictions of two recent theories of realism of confidence. Ecological approaches to realism of confidence in one's general knowledge (Gigerenzer et al., 1991;
Reasons for confidence.
People are often overconfident in evaluating the correctness of their knowledge. The present studies investigated the possibility that assessment of confidence is biased by attempts to justify one's
Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence.
A comprehensive framework for the theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM theory) is proposed, which explains both the overconfidence effect and the hard-easy effect and predicts conditions under which both effects appear, disappear, or invert.
Realism of confidence in sensory discrimination: The underconfidence phenomenon
It is concluded that the subjective distance theory provides a better explanation of the underconfidence phenomenon than-do previous accounts in terms of subconscious processes.
An explanation of the hard-easy effect in studies of realism of confidence in one's general knowledge
Abstract Recent ecological approaches to realism of confidence in general knowledge (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Kleinbolting, 1991; Juslin, in press) argue that people are well-calibrated to their