Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference

@article{Gehrlein2001CondorcetEA,
  title={Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference},
  author={William V. Gehrlein and Fabrice Valognes},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2001},
  volume={18},
  pages={193-205}
}
Abstract. The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidates in a series of pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional probability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules (WSR's) on three candidates for large electorates when voter indifference between candidates is allowed. It is shown that… Expand
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