Corpus ID: 8230466

Condorcet Methods are Less Susceptible to Strategic Voting

  title={Condorcet Methods are Less Susceptible to Strategic Voting},
  author={Tiance Wang and P. Cuff and Sanjeev Kulkarni},
Democratically choosing a single preference from three or more candidate options is not a straightforward matter. There are many competing ideas on how to aggregate rankings of candidates. However, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem pessimistically concludes that no fair voting system is immune to strategic voting. In our work we analyze the likelihood of strategic voting of several popular voting systems, including Borda count, plurality and Kemeny-Young, under various vote distributions. When… CONTINUE READING


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