• Corpus ID: 8230466

Condorcet Methods are Less Susceptible to Strategic Voting

@inproceedings{Wang2013CondorcetMA,
  title={Condorcet Methods are Less Susceptible to Strategic Voting},
  author={Tiance Wang and Paul W. Cuff and Sanjeev Kulkarni},
  year={2013}
}
Democratically choosing a single preference from three or more candidate options is not a straightforward matter. There are many competing ideas on how to aggregate rankings of candidates. However, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem pessimistically concludes that no fair voting system is immune to strategic voting. In our work we analyze the likelihood of strategic voting of several popular voting systems, including Borda count, plurality and Kemeny-Young, under various vote distributions. When… 

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 12 REFERENCES
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
It has been conjectured that no system of voting can preclude strategic voting-the securing by a voter of an outcome he prefers through misrepresentation of his preferences. In this paper, for all
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
TLDR
A quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is proved: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is
A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
  • M. Balinski, R. Laraki
  • Computer Science, Medicine
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
  • 2007
The impossibility theorems that abound in the theory of social choice show that there can be no satisfactory method for electing and ranking in the context of the traditional, 700-year-old model. A
Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
Explores, for several classes of social choice rules, the distribution of the number of profiles at which a rule can be strategically manipulated. In this paper, we will do comparative social choice,
Behavioral Social Choice - Probabilistic Models, Statistical Inference, and Applications
TLDR
This work investigates the lack of theoretical and practical support for majority cycles in probabilistic models of social choice behavior and proposes a general concept of majority rule.
A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem
  • G. Kalai
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
    Adv. Appl. Math.
  • 2002
We describe a Fourier-theoretic formula for the probability of rational outcomes for a social choice function on three alternatives. Several applications are given.
Among the respondents, 359 identified themselves as Republicans, 391 as Democrats, and 537 as independent
  • Method Valid Responses Google/FiveThirtyeight 887 Mercer County Panel 291 Mechanical Turk 472 Total
  • 1650
Our link was shown to random Google users and NYTimes (FiveThirtyEight blog) readers in the US. Users who clicked on our ads were taken to our online survey
  • Our link was shown to random Google users and NYTimes (FiveThirtyEight blog) readers in the US. Users who clicked on our ads were taken to our online survey
The respondents were Amazon Mechanical Turk users living in the US
  • The respondents were Amazon Mechanical Turk users living in the US
...
1
2
...