Condorcet's Theory of Voting

  title={Condorcet's Theory of Voting},
  author={H. Peyton Young},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={1231 - 1244}
  • H. Young
  • Published 1 December 1988
  • Economics
  • American Political Science Review
Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the “best” decision for society but voters sometimes make mistakes in their judgments, then the majority alternative (if it exists) is statistically most likely to be the best choice. Strictly speaking, this claim is not true; in some situations Bordas rule gives a sharper estimate of the best alternative… 

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