Conditions for intuitive expertise: a failure to disagree.

@article{Kahneman2009ConditionsFI,
  title={Conditions for intuitive expertise: a failure to disagree.},
  author={D. Kahneman and G. Klein},
  journal={The American psychologist},
  year={2009},
  volume={64 6},
  pages={
          515-26
        }
}
This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conflicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes flawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality… Expand
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