• Corpus ID: 18945316

Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior : Redistribution and Clientelism in Developing Democracies ∗

  title={Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior : Redistribution and Clientelism in Developing Democracies ∗},
  author={Cesar Zucco},
In this paper I examine the electoral consequences of conditional cash-transfer programs (CCTs) that provide individualized benefits based on objective eligibility criteria. I employ a variety of statistical approaches to both individual and aggregate data from Brazil and find that even in an environment were citizens’ electoral behavior is not monitored they nevertheless reward incumbents who provide CCT benefits, even though these benefits are universally distributed without regard for… 

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