Concessionary federalism in a dominant party system? Indirect tax reforms and subnational acquiescence in India

  title={Concessionary federalism in a dominant party system? Indirect tax reforms and subnational acquiescence in India},
  author={Chanchal Kumar Sharma},
  journal={Territory, Politics, Governance},
  pages={32 - 50}
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