Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game

  title={Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game},
  author={Jared Piazza and Jesse M. Bering},
  journal={Evolution and Human Behavior},
In the present study, a modified dictator game was used to test the hypothesis that the threat of gossip would encourage prosocial decision making. All participants were asked to distribute an endowment between themselves and an anonymous second party. Half of the participants were told that the second party would be discussing their economic decision with a third party. For some participants, this third party was someone to whom they had first disclosed personally identifying information… 

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