Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap

  title={Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap},
  author={Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker},
  journal={The Philosophical Review},
The explanatory gap. Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states (Nagel 1974, Levine 1983). Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain-say, activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6-as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual… 

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