Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis

  title={Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis},
  author={Graham T. Allison},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={689 - 718}
  • G. Allison
  • Published 1 November 1969
  • Political Science
  • American Political Science Review
The Cuban missile crisis is a seminal event. For thirteen days of October 1962, there was a higher probability that more human lives would end suddenly than ever before in history. Had the worst occurred, the death of 100 million Americans, over 100 million Russians, and millions of Europeans as well would make previous natural calamities and inhumanities appear insignificant. Given the probability of disaster—which President Kennedy estimated as “between 1 out of 3 and even”—our escape seems… 

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