Concepts of supervenience

  title={Concepts of supervenience},
  author={Jaegwon Kim},
  journal={Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  • Jaegwon Kim
  • Published 1 December 1984
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
We think of the world around us not as a mere assemblage of unrelated objects, events, and facts, but as constituting a system, something that shows structure, and whose constituents are connected with one another in significant ways. This view of the world seems fundamental to our scheme of things; it is reflected in the commonplace assumption that things that happen in one place can make a difference to things that happen in another in a way that enables us to make sense of one thing in terms… 
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