Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind *

@inproceedings{Machery2004ConceptsAN,
  title={Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind *},
  author={Edouard Machery},
  year={2004}
}
In cognitive psychology, concepts are those bodies of knowledge that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings’ higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning, etc.). Most psychologists of concepts assume that these mental representations share many scientifically important properties, and the psychology of concepts is expected to describe those properties. Psychologists assume thereby that concepts constitute a natural kind. I call… CONTINUE READING

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