Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
@inproceedings{Conitzer2006ComputingTO, title={Computing the optimal strategy to commit to}, author={Vincent Conitzer and T. Sandholm}, booktitle={EC '06}, year={2006} }
In multiagent systems, strategic settings are often analyzed under the assumption that the players choose their strategies simultaneously. However, this model is not always realistic. In many settings, one player is able to commit to a strategy before the other player makes a decision. Such models are synonymously referred to as leadership, commitment, or Stackelberg models, and optimal play in such models is often significantly different from optimal play in the model where strategies are… CONTINUE READING
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