Computing Shapley Value in Supermodular Coalitional Games

  title={Computing Shapley Value in Supermodular Coalitional Games},
  author={David Liben-Nowell and Alexa Sharp and Tom Wexler and Kevin Woods},
Coalitional games allow subsets (coalitions) of players to cooperate to receive a collective payoff. This payoff is then distributed “fairly” among the members of that coalition according to some division scheme. Various solution concepts have been proposed as reasonable schemes for generating fair allocations. The Shapley value is one classic solution concept: player i’s share is precisely equal to i’s expected marginal contribution if the players join the coalition one at a time, in a… CONTINUE READING
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