Computer-Aided Security Proofs for the Working Cryptographer

@inproceedings{Barthe2011ComputerAidedSP,
  title={Computer-Aided Security Proofs for the Working Cryptographer},
  author={Gilles Barthe and Benjamin Gr{\'e}goire and Sylvain Heraud and Santiago Zanella B{\'e}guelin},
  booktitle={CRYPTO},
  year={2011}
}
We present EasyCrypt, an automated tool for elaborating security proofs of cryptographic systems from proof sketches-compact, formal representations of the essence of a proof as a sequence of games and hints. Proof sketches are checked automatically using off-the-shelf SMT solvers and automated theorem provers, and then compiled into verifiable proofs in the CertiCrypt framework. The tool supports most common reasoning patterns and is significantly easier to use than its predecessors. We argue… 
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253 Citations
Highly Influential Citations
28
Background Citations
78
Methods Citations
106
Results Citations
2

253 Citations

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Citation Type

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