Computer-Aided Proofs for Multiparty Computation with Active Security

  title={Computer-Aided Proofs for Multiparty Computation with Active Security},
  author={Helene Haagh and Aleksandr Karbyshev and Sabine Oechsner and Bas Spitters and Pierre-Yves Strub},
  journal={2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)},
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a general cryptographic technique that allows distrusting parties to compute a function of their individual inputs, while only revealing the output of the function. It has found applications in areas such as auctioning, email filtering, and secure teleconference. Given their importance, it is crucial that the protocols are specified and implemented correctly. In the programming language community, it has become good practice to use computer proof… 
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