Computationally Limited Agents in Auctions

  title={Computationally Limited Agents in Auctions},
  author={Kate Larson},
Auctions provide eÆcient and distributed ways of allocating goods and tasks among agents. In this paper we study optimal strategies for computationally limited agents, where agents must use their limited resources in order to compute valuations for (bundles of) the items being auctioned. Agents are free to compute on any valuation problems including their opponents'. The deliberation actions are incorporated into the agents' strategies and di erent auction settings (both single{item and… CONTINUE READING
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