Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship

@article{Aziz2015ComputationalAO,
  title={Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship},
  author={Haris Aziz and F. Brandt and Markus Brill and Juli{\'a}n Mestre},
  journal={SIGecom Exch.},
  year={2015},
  volume={13},
  pages={26-30}
}
Two fundamental problems in economics are voting and assignment. In both settings, random serial dictatorship is a well-established mechanism that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. We present an overview of recent results on the computational complexity of problems related to random serial dictatorship. 
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