Computation and cognition: issues in the foundations of cognitive science

  title={Computation and cognition: issues in the foundations of cognitive science},
  author={Zenon W. Pylyshyn},
  journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  pages={111 - 132}
  • Z. Pylyshyn
  • Published 1 March 1980
  • Philosophy
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Abstract The computational view of mind rests on certain intuitions regarding the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. We examine some of these intuitions and suggest that they derive from the fact that computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. Some of the implications of this view are discussed. It is suggested that a fundamental hypothesis of this approach… 
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