Computation and Incentives of Competitive Equilibria in a Matching Market

  title={Computation and Incentives of Competitive Equilibria in a Matching Market},
  author={Ning Chen and Xiaotie Deng},
Matching market and its many variants have been an intensively studied problem in Economics and Computer Science. In many applications centralized prices are used to determine allocations of indivisible items under the principles of individual optimization and market clearance, based on public knowledge of individual preferences. Alternatively, auction mechanisms have been used with a different set of principles for the determination of prices, based on individuals' incentives to report their… 



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