Composition of markets with conflicting incentives

@inproceedings{Dimitrov2010CompositionOM,
  title={Composition of markets with conflicting incentives},
  author={Stanko Dimitrov and Rahul Sami},
  booktitle={EC},
  year={2010}
}
We study information revelation in scoring rule and prediction market mechanisms in settings in which traders have conflicting incentives due to opportunities to profit from the market operator's subsequent actions. In our canonical model, an agent Alice is offered an incentive-compatible scoring rule to reveal her beliefs about a future event, but can also profit from misleading another trader Bob about her information and then making money off Bob's error in a subsequent market. We show that… CONTINUE READING
Highly Cited
This paper has 18 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS

From This Paper

Figures, tables, results, connections, and topics extracted from this paper.
11 Extracted Citations
4 Extracted References
Similar Papers

Referenced Papers

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-4 of 4 references

Prediction markets for corporate governance

  • Michael B. Abramowicz, M. Todd Henderson
  • Social Science Research Network Working Paper…
  • 2006
Highly Influential
9 Excerpts

Prediction markets

  • Justin Wolfers, Eric Zitzewitz
  • The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
  • 2004
Highly Influential
5 Excerpts

Verification of forecasts expressed in terms of probability

  • Glenn W. Brier
  • Monthly Weather Review,
  • 1950
Highly Influential
3 Excerpts

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…