Complexity versus conflict in communication

@article{Sobel2012ComplexityVC,
  title={Complexity versus conflict in communication},
  author={Joel Sobel},
  journal={2012 46th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS)},
  year={2012},
  pages={1-6}
}
Equilibrium models of costless strategic communication provide four insights, which can be summarized informally by: failure to communicate is always possible; perfect communication is not possible when conflict of interest exists between the informed Sender and the uninformed Receiver; whenever non-trivial communication is possible, there are multiple equilibrium outcomes; the quality of information communicated in equilibrium and the potential benefits of communication increase when the… CONTINUE READING

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