Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions

@article{Conitzer2006ComplexityOC,
  title={Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions},
  author={Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm},
  journal={Artif. Intell.},
  year={2006},
  volume={170},
  pages={607-619}
}
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can accomplish them more efficiently. Motivating the agents to abide by a solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition. This constraint has been studied… CONTINUE READING
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