Corpus ID: 207924581

Complexity of CEO Compensation Packages

@inproceedings{Albuquerque2015ComplexityOC,
  title={Complexity of CEO Compensation Packages},
  author={Ana M. Albuquerque and Mary Ellen Carter},
  year={2015}
}
We examine the extent to which the complexity of CEO compensation packages is consistent with the efficient contracting or the rent extraction view. Using samples of firms from ExecuComp and Incentive Lab from 2006 – 2012, we construct both an ex-post and an ex-ante measure of the complexity of CEO compensation and examine their relation with both economic determinants of contract complexity and excess CEO pay. We find that proxies for firm complexity are associated with more contract… Expand

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