• Corpus ID: 1972

Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria

@inproceedings{Conitzer2003ComplexityRA,
  title={Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria},
  author={Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm},
  booktitle={IJCAI},
  year={2003}
}
Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be computed. In this paper, we provide a single reduction that 1) demonstrates NP-hardness of determining whether Nash equilibria with certain natural properties exist, and 2) demonstrates the NP-hardness of counting Nash equilibria (or connected sets of Nash equilibria). We also show that 3) determining whether a… 

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