Complements and substitutes in generalized multisided assignment economies

@article{Tejada2013ComplementsAS,
  title={Complements and substitutes in generalized multisided assignment economies},
  author={Oriol Tejada},
  journal={Oper. Res. Lett.},
  year={2013},
  volume={41},
  pages={468-473}
}
We consider a finitely populated economy in which there are different types of agent, each agent is of exactly one type, and profit is created by coalitions containing at most one agent of each type (or side). The surplus of a so-called generalized multisided assignment economy is defined as the maximum aggregate profit that can be attained by matching agents into pairwise disjoint coalitions of the above kind. We present negative results that establish that when the economy consists of more… CONTINUE READING