# Competitive equilibria between staking and on-chain lending

@article{Chitra2020CompetitiveEB,
title={Competitive equilibria between staking and on-chain lending},
author={T. Chitra},
journal={ArXiv},
year={2020},
volume={abs/2001.00919}
}
• T. Chitra
• Published 28 November 2019
• Computer Science
• ArXiv
Proof of Stake (PoS) is a burgeoning Sybil resistance mechanism that aims to have a digital asset ("token") serve as security collateral in crypto networks. However, PoS has so far eluded a comprehensive threat model that encompasses both Byzantine attacks from distributed systems and financial attacks that arise from the dual usage of the token as a means of payment and a Sybil resistance mechanism. In particular, the existence of derivatives markets makes malicious coordination among…
10 Citations

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