Competitive effects of vertical integration

  title={Competitive effects of vertical integration},
  author={Michael H. Riordan},
The paper surveys the economics literature on the competitive effects of vertical integration, assesses the relevance of the economics literature for several recent regulatory and antitrust cases, and defends a structured rule of reason approach to evaluating the competitive effects. JEL classification: K4, L5 
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