Competitive auctions and digital goods

  title={Competitive auctions and digital goods},
  author={Andrew V. Goldberg and Jason D. Hartline and Andrew Wright},
We study a class of single round, sealed bid auctions for items in unlimited supply such as digital goods. We focus on auctions that are truthful and competitive. Truthful auctions encourage bidders to bid their utility; competitive auctions yield revenue within a constant factor of the revenue for optimal fixed pricing. We show that for any truthful auction, even a multi-price auction, the expected revenue does not exceed that for optimal fixed pricing. We also give a bound on how far the… CONTINUE READING
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  • W. Vickrey
  • Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. J. of…
  • 1961
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